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Abstract: We employ existing data sets and agent-based modeling to forecast changes in religiosity and exis-
tential security among a collective of individuals over time. Existential security reflects the extent of economic,
socioeconomic and humandevelopment provided by society. Ourmodel includes agents in social networks in-
teractingwith one another based on the education level of the agents, the religious practices of the agents, and
each agent’s existential security within their natural and social environments. The data used to inform the val-
ues and relationships among these variables is based on rigorous statistical analysis of the International Social
Survey Programme Religion Module (ISSP) and the Human Development Report (HDR). We conduct an evalu-
ation that demonstrates, for the countries and time periods studied, that our model provides a more accurate
forecast of changes in existential security and religiosity than two alternative approaches. The improved accu-
racy is largely due to the inclusion of social networkswith educational homophilywhich alters theway inwhich
religiosity and existential security change in the model. These dynamics grow societies where two individuals
with the same initial religious practices (or belief In God, or supernatural beliefs) evolve dierently based on
the educational backgrounds of the individuals with which they surround themselves. Finally, we discuss the
limitations of our model and provide direction for future work.
Keywords: Religion, Agent-Based Model, Data Based Modeling, Social Influence, Social Network
Introduction
1.1 Traditional approaches to the social-scientific study of religion have diiculty accounting for the variedways in
which education, existential security, and social networks shape the religiosity of an individual and a collective
of individuals. Existential security reflects the extent of economic, socioeconomic and human development
provided by society (Norris & Inglehart 2011). Furthermore, understanding the dynamics of the relationship
among these factors over time adds complexity. Simulated environments have been used to test dierent the-
oriesof religiousextremismanddierentproposals for reducing religiousviolence (Upal 2005;Bainbridge2006;
Iannaccone & Makowsky 2007). However, we are unaware of any previous work to model the relationships of
the aforementioned factors with respect to a collective of individuals in agent-based model using established
empirical data sources. In this paper we explore this issue.
1.2 Our model can be parameterized for a given country and time period. Each agent has variables that reflect
their education level, their existential insecurity, and dierent facets of their religiosity. In addition to these
characteristics, each agent is connected to a social network of other agents. Based on their interactions with
one another, the existential insecurity and religiosity variables of the agents change. We explore the behavior
of the model to highlight those conditions that drive a collective of individuals over time to become more or
less: (1) religious and (2) existentially secure.
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1.3 Next, we conduct anevaluationwhichdemonstrates that, for the countries and timeperiods studied, ourmodel
provides a more accurate forecast of changes in existential security and religiosity than two alternative ap-
proaches. Both the data processing in our model that leverages existing data sets and the relative accuracy of
the forecasts are novel contributions. We conclude the paper by discussing the context in which of our model
is valid and our model’s limitations. Despite the identified limitations, the model reflects an eort to link em-
piricism and theory within an ABM as advocated by Flache et al. (2017).
Background
2.1 In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of the major theoretical concerns related to the main vari-
ables in ourmodel: religiosity, education, and existential security. In the sections that follow, we point to some
of the previous simulation research related to these topics and present our own agent-basedmodel.
2.2 Our firstmainvariable is religiosity. Although theuseof this term ishighly contested, there is significant research
fromawidevarietyofdisciplines indicating that cohesion-enhancing ritualbehaviors intended toengagesuper-
natural agents that are believed to be interested in human aairs are virtually universal across cultures. These
behaviors are the result of cognitive tendencies that are culturally evoked in a variety of ways (Atran 2004; Mc-
Cauley & Lawson 2002; Wildman 2009; Shults 2015). In addition to this contextual variance, scholars of religion
have also identified many ways in which these features vary across individuals in human populations. Despite
this variance, the relevant features recur across cultures in recognizablepatterns (Schuurmans-Stekhoven2016;
Caldwell-Harris 2012; Gebauer et al. 2012; Barber 2014).
2.3 The second main variable is education. The relationship between education and religiosity is well researched.
Most studies show that there is a significant negative correlation between education and religiosity (Blancke
et al. 2012; Hill 2014; Hungerman 2014; Lewis 2015). It is well known that scientists, for example, are typically
less religious than the general population; this is oen attributed to their educational background, which trains
them to be analytical thinkers (Larson & Witham 1998; McCauley 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais 2013). There is
some research that challenges the idea that education is always negatively related to religiosity. One study,
for example, found that education was negatively associated with religiosity only for individuals with a weak
religious background (Ganzach et al. 2013). However, the consensus in the literature is that analytical thinking
skills taught in higher education are negatively correlatedwith religiosity evenwhen controlling for the strength
of one’s religious background (Dutton & Van der Linden 2017; Lynn et al. 2009). For the purposes of our model,
we use a specific measure of education from an international survey as a proxy for education variables (i.e.
analytical thinking) that negatively correlate with religiosity.
2.4 Existential security is our thirdmain variable. The definition of existential security we adopt is related to the se-
curity axiom, which is basedon the idea that "societies around theworlddier greatly in their levels of economic
and human development and socioeconomic equality - and consequently, in the extent to which they provide
their people with a sense of existential security" (Norris & Inglehart 2011). This axiom is based on cross-cultural
survey analyses that show that "the emergence of high levels of existential security tends to diminish anxiety
and stress, promoting feelings of psychologicalwell-being" -which, in turn, they argue, reduces the importance
of religious values in people’s lives (Norris & Inglehart 2011, 2015).
2.5 Other research has shown that as secular institutions increasingly provide existential security for a population,
there is a reduced reliance on religious institutions, which appears to cause a decline in religious belief and
participation (Norenzayan 2015; Stolz et al. 2016; Kay et al. 2010; Habel & Grant 2013). This is particularly clear in
Scandinavian societies such as Norway, where people feel they are protected by a strong social safety net, and
report higher levels of existential security (and lower levels of religiosity) than most other countries (Kvande
et al. 2015). Quantifying existential security, as we do in our model, is similar to the quantification of other
human perceptions such as happiness (Helliwell et al. 2012; Gore et al. 2015; Dodds et al. 2011; Mitchell et al.
2013) orwell-being (Deaton 2008; McMahan & Estes 2011; Decancq & Lugo 2013).
2.6 The agent-based model we describe in Section 4 explores the relationship between religiosity, education, and
existential security. In future work, we plan to explore other factors that influence religiosity, such as pluralism
and freedom of expression. While related research eorts have included the use of statistics to support their
analyses, none have used agent-based models to forecast the way in which these factors aect changes in the
religiosity of a population over time. Our work begins to fill this gap.
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RelatedWork
3.1 Our model draws on social influence modeling and is related to a number of existing agent-based models. We
review social influence modeling first and then describe the ABMs which are most closely related to our work.
Social influencemodeling
3.2 Social influence is an important factor in human interaction. In encounters, individuals can modify their opin-
ions, attitudes, beliefs, or behavior to mimic or to oppose those they interact with. Thesemodifications can be
the result of persuasion, uncertainty or peer pressure (Flache et al. 2017).
3.3 Initial social influence models included actors whose opinion on a position was socially influenced on a con-
tinuous spectrum (Abelson 1967; Berger 1981; DeGroot 1974; Lehrer 1975). Examples of these models include
agents determining the appropriate speedon an interstate. Later,modelers assumed that opinions did not vary
on a continuous scale but instead reflected a choice betweenmutually exclusive options (Axelrod 1997; Latané
1996; Liggett 1985; Sznajd-Weron & Sznajd 2000). Here, examples include political parties, music and movies.
In some cases it is possible to model mutually exclusive options as nominal traits on a continuous spectrum
(Nowak et al. 1990; Flache et al. 2017).
3.4 Recently, researchers have identified three classes of social-influence models that are the most popular in
agent-basedmodeling. These classes of social influencemodels are: (1) assimilative social influence (Durkheim
[1901] 2014; Myers 1982; Vinokur & Burnstein 1978; Akers et al. 1979), (2) similarity biased influence (Axelrod 1997;
Carley 1991; Deuant et al. 2000; Hegselmann et al. 2002; Mark 1998) and (3) repulsive influence (Jager & Am-
blard 2005; Macy et al. 2003; Mark 2003).
3.5 In assimilative social influence models, individuals are connected by a structural relationship and always in-
fluence each other to reduce opinion dierences. Here, if the network is connected the influence dynamics
eventually create consensus (Flache et al. 2017).
3.6 For models with similarity biased influence, only suiciently similar individuals can influence each other to
reduce opinion dierences. How much similarity is suicient depends on other mechanisms included in the
model (e.g. social identity, confidence inothers, etc). With similarity based influence consensus canbeavoided.
However, if the similarity bias is suiciently strong, then multiple homogenous but distinct clusters of individ-
uals emerge. Opinions, however, never leave the initial range (Deuant et al. 2000; Hegselmann et al. 2002;
Flache et al. 2017).
3.7 Inmodelswith repulsive influence,when individuals are toodissimilar they can influenceeachother to increase
opinion dierences. The amount of dissimilarity needed to trigger repulsive influence depends on othermech-
anisms included in the model (e.g. social identity, ego-involvement). Here, consensus can be avoided. Also,
clusters can form and adopt maximally opposing views (bi-polarization). These dynamics allow opinions to
leave the initial range (Flache et al. 2017).
3.8 It is important to note that most social influence models represent opinions as a one-dimensional variable.
However, recent research has shown the importance of using a multidimensional model to study opinion po-
larization (Li & Xiao 2017). We employ thismulti-dimensional representation in our representation of religiosity.
Related simulations
3.9 Other researchershaveemployedmodelingandsimulationmethodologies to simulateculturally relevant change
within individuals and collectives of individuals. Axelrod’s dissemination of culturemodel simulated a variety
of mechanisms showing how interaction between dierent cultural features challenges intuitive assumptions
about individuals’ beliefs and interpersonal behavior (Axelrod 1997). Chattoe and Hamill used an agent-based
model to demonstrate that social networks situate beliefs. Specifically, the model shows that what one knows
depends largely on who one knows (Chattoe & Hamill 2005). Chattoe also demonstrated how church survival,
in terms of membership, is a function of rational choice theory (Chattoe 2006).
3.10 More recently, Upal andGibbondevelopedanagent based system for simulating thedynamics of social identity
beliefs that aimed at isolating factors that contribute to intergroup conflict (Upal & Gibbon 2015). Shults et al.
developed two dierent computer simulations to demonstrate the impact of mortality salience on religiosity
(Shults et al. 2018). At the same time, other researchers have used simulations of artificial societies composed
of agents of two psychological types to create preferential self-organization into groups of ideological ainity
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Model Entity Name Attributes Representation
Agent Religious Formation (RF) Real number in [0,1]
Religious Practice (RP) Real number in [0,1]
Supernatural Beliefs (SB) Real number in [0,1]
Belief In God (BIG) Real number in [0,1]
Education (ED) Integer from (1) no formal educa-
tion to (6) university level with de-
gree
Existential Insecurity (EI) Real number in [0,1]
Social Network (SN) Strength of relationship between
any two agents
2-DMatrix of Real numbers in [0,1]
Existential Security of Environ-
ment (ES)
NA Real number in [0,1]
Table 1: Model entities
(Abrica-Jacinto et al. 2017). Finally, agent-basedmodeling has also been used to study role of the emergence of
a priestly class in solving large-scale social network coordination (Dávid-Barrett & Carney 2016), as well as the
mechanisms that shape dierent modes of ritual interaction (Whitehouse et al. 2012).
The Simulation Model
4.1 The goal of our model is for a given time period and country to predict changes in the existential security and
the religiosity of a collective of individuals using an agent-based model. Here we describe the architecture of
ourmodel including: (1) the entities within themodel, (2) the data sources used to initialize the entities, and (3)
the rules that dictate the interactions among them.
Model entities
4.2 Ourmodel ismadeupof agents interacting through social networks in an environment definedby its existential
security level. Recall, existential security reflects the extent of economic, socioeconomic and human develop-
mentprovidedbyacountry (Norris& Inglehart 2011). Eachagenthasaneducation level, anexistential insecurity
level, and four variables that reflect their religiosity. Each agent is also connected to a subset of the other agents
in the model through a social network. An overview of these entities, with their attributes and representation,
is shown in Table 1.
Religiosity variables
4.3 The four variables that reflect religiosity in each agent are: (1) religious formation, (2) religious practice, (3)
supernatural beliefs, and (4) belief in God. The identification of these variables is based on a rigorous statistical
analysis of questions and responses from the International Social Survey Programme Religion Module (ISSP)
(Davis & Jowell 1989). This data contains the cumulated variables of the ISSP “Religion” surveys of 1991, 1998
and 2008 and includes 102,454 respondents frommore than 20 countries.
4.4 Table 2 shows the questions selected for statistical analysis as well as the questions’ labels, number of valid
Likert levels, and an indication of if we performed polarity inversion on the question. Questions V11-16 tap atti-
tudes and values that are oen explored in relation to religiosity. Questions V20-24were included to study the
correlation between religiosity and confidence in institutions. Questions V25-27 are related to the relationship
between religion and politics. Questions V28-33, V35, V37 and V51 are related to beliefs in the “supernatu-
ral,” particularly in God (V28-29 and V35). Questions V46-48 are related to the attendance of the respondent’s
mother and father, and self-attendance during a formative period (ages 11-12), which is oen considered to be
particularly influential on religious belief and practice later in life (Henrich 2009; Gervais & Najle 2015; Lanman
2012). Questions V49 (frequency of praying), V50 (participation in church activities other than regular religious
services) and ATTEND (frequency of participation in regular religious services) are related to the respondent’s
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Label Question Text # of Levels Inversion
V11 Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have
sexual relations before marriage?
4 Yes
V12 What about a married person having sexual relations with some-
one other than his or her husband or wife?
4 Yes
V13 What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex? 4 Yes
V14 Is it wrong to have an abortion if there is a strong chance of serious
defect in the baby?
4 Yes
V15 Is it wrong to have an abortion if the family has a very low income
and cannot aord any more children?
4 Yes
V16 Agree/Disagree: A husband’s job is to earnmoney; a wife’s job is to
look aer the home and family
5 Yes
V20 Howmuch confidence do you have in Parliament (i.e. national leg-
islature)?
5 Yes
V21 Howmuch confidence do you have in business and industry? 5 Yes
V22 Howmuch confidence do you have in churches and religious orga-
nizations?
5 Yes
V23 Howmuch confidence do you have in courts and the legal system? 5 Yes
V24 Howmuch confidence do you have in schools and the educational
system?
5 Yes
V25 Agree/Disagree: Religious leaders should not try to influence how
people vote in elections.
5 No
V26 Agree/Disagree: Religious leaders should not try to influence gov-
ernment decisions.
5 No
V27 Doyou think that churchesand religiousorganizations in this coun-
try have toomuch power or too little power?
5 No
V28 Please indicate which statement comes closest to expressing what
you believe about God.
6 No
V29 Which best describes your beliefs about God? 4 No
V30 Do you believe in life aer death? 4 Yes
V31 Do you believe in heaven? 4 Yes
V32 Do you believe in hell? 4 Yes
V33 Do you believe in religious miracles? 4 Yes
V35 Agree/Disagree: There is a God who concerns Himself with every
human being personally?
5 Yes
V37 Agree/Disagree: To me, life is meaningful only because God exists. 5 Yes
V46 When youwere a child, how oen did yourmother attend religious
services?
9 No
V47 When you were a child, how oen did your father attend religious
services?
9 No
V48 What about when you were around 11 or 12, how oen did you at-
tend religious services then?
9 No
V49 About how oen do you pray? 11 No
V50 How oen do you take part in the activities or organizations of a
church or place of worship other than attending services?
11 No
V51 Would you describe yourself as religious? 7 Yes
V64 Agree/Disagree: Overall, modern science does more harm than
good.
5 Yes
V65 Agree/Disagree: We trust too much in science and not enough in
religious faith.
5 Yes
ATTEND How oen do you attend religious services? 6 Yes
Table 2: Initial set of selected questions in the ISSP data set: variables’ names, labels, number of valid levels
and indication of polarity inversion.
current religious practice. Since science is oen in competition with supernatural beliefs, we also included
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questions V64-65.
4.5 The goal of the analysis of this data was to filter and aggregate the 31 questions in Table 2 into a lower number
of unobserved variables called factors. The analysis results in a factor score for each respondent, for each fac-
tor, based on the respondent’s answers to the questions included in the factor. Factor scores are continuous
numbers, which reflect the extent to which each respondent manifests each factor. For each factor, scores are
distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. However, we normalize scores for each
factor on a 0 to 1 scale. Thus, a value of 1 reflects a respondent where the factor is heavily present and a value
of 0 reflects a respondent where the factor is not present at all (DiStefano et al. 2009).
4.6 Ultimately, we identified 13 questions that form the aforementioned four religiosity factors. These questions
and the factors they form are shown in Figure 1. Additional details about the choices associated with each
question, iterative steps within the factor analysis, and the resulting measures of fit and statistical significance
are provided in (Lemos et al. 2017).
Figure 1: Religiosity factors and associated questions from analysis of ISSP data. Analysis details, fit statistics,
and statistical significance are provided in (Lemos et al. 2017).
Existential security
4.7 Each agent is connected to the existential security level of the environment. The existential security level of the
environment reflects the percentage of the agents that feel the level of economic, socioeconomic and human
development support provided to them is suicient. An agent determines if they feel existentially secure by
checking if their value for existential insecurity is below the existential security value of the environment. The
initialization of these entities and the variables that make up each agent are described next. Then the descrip-
tion of the interactions among agents and the environment are presented.
Data sources used to initialize entities
4.8 The initialization of each entity is basedon the country and timeperiod beingmodeled. For a given country and
a given year, the existential security level of the environment is initialized using data from the Human Devel-
opment Report (HDR). The HDR is an annual multi-facetted analysis of wellbeing focused on key dimensions of
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human development including a long life, a healthy life, and a decent standard of living. The Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) is the summarymeasureused in theHDR for a country’s achievement across thesedimensions
(Anand 1994).
4.9 Similarly, based on a specific country and a specific year, an agent is initialized by randomly sampling an ISSP
respondent. Using the respondent’s data, the characteristics of an agent are parameterized. Specifically, the
factor scores for the four religiosity factors of the chosen ISSP respondent initialize the agent’s religiosity vari-
ables and the education level of the respondent parameterizes the agent’s education level.
4.10 The education level of the respondent is based on the answer to the question: "What is the highest level of
education you’ve achieved?" Responses to the question are coded on a 6-point scale from: (1) no formal educa-
tion to (6) university level with degree. We do not employ factor analysis for the education variable because this
questionmeasures a response that is very close to the variable we want to capture and there are no additional
questions related to education within the ISSP.
4.11 Finally, the existential insecurity level of an agent is parameterized by sampling a uniformdistribution between
0 and 1. While this parameterization is not based on data, the interactions of the model tie each individual’s
existential insecurity to the existential security level of the environment. This relationship is described further
in paragraph 4.25.
4.12 Each agent is also assigned a social network. The social network reflects an agent’s set of active social relation-
ships. The number of and weight of the links within the network is constructed by an algorithm (Conti et al.
2011) thatmirrors human social networks observed in thewild (Hill & Dunbar 2003; Dunbar & Shultz 2007). This
research indicates that human relationships have a hierarchical structure and an individual has ∼ 135 active
social relationships (Dunbar 2009).
4.13 This limit is due to cognitive and time constraints of the individual (Hill & Dunbar 2003). The hierarchical struc-
ture of the network consists of a series of concentric layers of acquaintancewith increasing sizes. The layers are
hierarchically inclusive, so that each layer includes all inner levels. The innermost layer is the support group of
the individual (size∼ 5) followed by the sympathy group (size∼ 12) and then entire active network (size∼ 135).
This structure is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Hierarchical structure of social network for each agent.
4.14 Within the network each relationship is also characterized by a level of emotional closeness. Strong relation-
ships have a higher level of emotional closeness than weaker ones. The closeness reflects both the frequency
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of contact and time since last contact within the period of one week (Roberts & Dunbar 2011; Conti et al. 2011).
In our implementation the emotional closeness is also correlated with the similarity in the education level of
agents. This relationship has been observed in a several dierent social anthropology studies (McPherson et al.
2001, 2006; Mark 2003; Salzarulo 2006; Chattoe & Hamill 2005). The degree to which the educational level of
the agent is correlated to the emotional closeness is determined by the parameter, Education Homophily (EH).
Interactions among entities
4.15 Given these initialized entities we define rules that govern the interactions among our entities. First, we review
rules that dictate how changing religiosity variables influence one another. Next, we describe how agent’s in-
teractions within their social network influence their existential insecurity and religiosity. Finally, we describe
the rules related to agent interactions with the existential security level of the environment.
Organizing Agent Religiosity
4.16 We use structural equation modeling (SEM) to organize the relationships among the four religiosity factors.
SEM enables us to hypothesize an architecture of the relationships among the factors and assess the extent
to which the hypothesized architecture matches the observed data from the ISSP. Using our four factors it is
possible to construct 588 unique SEM architectures. Of those 588, four models have identical fit statistics that
are superior to the other 584. Of the four models with the best fit statistics, one places the factors in an order
that is consistent with theories of religiosity posited in the scientific study of religion (Shults 2014; Holbrook
et al. 2015; Crescentini et al. 2014; Ramsay et al. 2015; Davidson et al. 2003; Lutz et al. 2008; Norenzayan et al.
2012). This model is shown in Figure 3. Additional details and fit statistics for this and other candidate models
are provided in (Lemos et al. 2017).
Figure 3: Structural equation model that organizes the four religiosity variables within an agent.
4.17 The model describes quantitatively how changes in religious practices and religious formation factors of an
agent predict changes in the agent’s belief in God and the agent’s supernatural beliefs. Religious formation
reflects questions related to the religious upbringing of the agent. Since this factor reflects events that have
happened in the agent’s past, we do not update the value of this variable in our model.
4.18 Recent research has shown the importance of using amultidimensional representation of opinion to study the
dynamicsof social influenceonpolarization (Li&Xiao2017). Weemploy this same idea inourmulti-dimensional
representation of religiosity shown in Figure 3. This capability can create a situation where two agents come
to a consensus in one dimension of religiosity (i.e. supernatural beliefs) while being influenced to have polar
opposite opinions on another (i.e belief In God).
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4.19 Next, we describe how the value of an agent’s religious practice and existential insecurity variables can change
based on influence from the social network.
Updating Agent Religiosity Values Based On Social Network Interactions
4.20 At each time step agents interact with the agents in their social network. Each time step corresponds to one
week. In this interaction the religiouspractice variable andexistential insecuritywithin the agent are influenced
by the respective values of these variables in other agents within their social network. The extent to which the
variable is influenced is determined by a time-dependent weighted average. Given a matrix IN that includes
an entry for the influence of each of theN agents on every other agent, the total influence exerted on agent i is






4.21 TotalInfluencei and a set A that includes all agents enables us to define, ASNv,t,i . Set A contains the value
of each variable v, at each time step t, for each agent j, throughout the simulation (Av,t,j). ASNv,t,i is the






Av,t,j × INi, j
TotalInfluencei
(2)
4.22 Based on the influence exerted on the agent’s religious practice variable from their social network at time t
(ASNRP,t,i ), new values for the agent’s supernatural belief (ASNSB,t,i ), and belief in God (ASNBIG,t,i ) variables
are generated using the equations in the model shown in Figure 3.
4.23 Finally eachvalue, basedon the influenceof theagent’s interactionwith thesocial network (ASNRP,t,i ,ASNSB,t,i ,
ASNBIG,t,i ,ASNEI,t,i ), is combinedwith the agent’s existing value for the respective variable. This combination
is computed using Cobb-Douglas function (Cobb & Douglas 1928). We employ the Cobb-Douglas function be-
cause it is an established, flexible, and widely usedmethod to aggregate the influence of the environment with





Interacting With The Environment
4.24 Once every agent has computed the influence of their social network on the applicable variables, every agent
interactswith theenvironment. Anagent interactswith theenvironmentbychecking if their value for existential
insecurity is below the existential security value of the environment. Recall for a given country and a given year,
the environment is initialized with the country’s HDI value. Also, recall that the existential insecurity value of
agents is initialized with a random number sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
4.25 This check reflects whether or not the agent is provided suicient existential security by the environment. For-
mally, the process of applying this check to allN agents at time step t to determine the influence of the agents
on the existential security level of the environment (ESagentInf,t) is shown in Equation 4. Agents with highEI
values are less likely to be provided suicient existential security, while agents with low EI values are more








1 ifAEI,t,i < ESt
0 ifAEI,t,i ≥ ESt
(4)
4.26 Finally, the value for the existential security of the environment in the next time step (t + 1) is computed by
combining the value of the existential security value of the environment at time t with ESagentInf,t at time
step t. This combination is also done with Cobb-Douglas function as described in Equation 3. The choice to
reuse this function and its parameter,β, improves parsimonyby reducing the total number of parameters in our
model. Recall, it also an established and widely used method to combine the intrinsic value of a variable with
an environmental influenceon the variable. Anoverviewof themodel and thedata sources used to initialize the
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entities within the model is shown in Figure 4. Appendix A contains a parameter table for the model indicating
the value of each parameter and the source of each parameter’s value.
Figure 4: Overview our of model and the data sources used to initialize the entities.
4.27 Each of the interactions among the entities use assimilative social influence. Recall, this social influencemodel
leads to general consensus amongst agents. However, employing social networks with educational homophily
andamulti-dimensional representationof religiosity allowsourmodel toavoidconsensus. Thesedynamics can
grow societies where two individuals with the same initial religious practices (or belief In God, or supernatural
beliefs) evolve dierently based on the educational backgrounds of the individuals with which they surround
themselves. In the next section we evaluate our model against two alternatives to determine its eectiveness
in forecasting changes in religiosity and existential security.
Evaluation
5.1 The eectiveness of our agent-based forecasts for changes in religiosity and existential security is elucidated
through empirical evaluation against alternative modeling approaches. Specifically, we compare our agent-
based approach to: (1) a baseline approach based entirely on historical data and (2) a statistical approach that
uses linear regression modeling (LR).
5.2 For a given period of time, eachmodel predicts changes in the religious practice, supernatural beliefs, belief In
God, and existential security of the population of a given country. The baseline approach assumes there will
be no changes in these factors from the most recent previous data. This approach mirrors predicting that the
weather tomorrow will be the same as the weather today. The statistical approach uses regression to predict
future changes in a variable using a weighted linear combination of the current variables (religious practice,
education level, religious formation, existential security, supernatural beliefs, and belief in God).
5.3 Weevaluate each of these candidatemodels using a three part process. First, we identify similar timeperiods of
measurement between the ISSP and HDR data. ISSP data was collected in 1991, 1998, and 2008 while HDR data
was collected in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2011-2014. Given that there is no intersection of
common data collection we use time periods of HDR data that are closest to the ISSP time periods. These time
periods are ISSP: 1991 - 1998 / HDR: 1990 - 2000 and ISSP: 1998 - 2008 / HDR: 2000 - 2010.
5.4 Next, for these time periods we identify the countries where data was collected in the ISSP and the HDR. There
are 11 countries where data is collected in both time periods for both data sources. These countries are: Ger-
many, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, United Kingdom, and
United States. The full availability of all country data within the ISSP and HDR is described in Appendix B.
5.5 Finally, we fit the parameters of each model. The baseline approach does not require this final step because it
does not have any parameters. However, to fit the parameters of the LR models and our agent-based model,
we perform an automated search over all the combinations of possible values for the parameters using data for
all countries in the previous time period for which there is both ISSP and HDR data.
5.6 The automated search identifies the parameters for the model that minimize the root mean squared error
(RMSE) of the absolute error of the mean forecast (ēa) for each variable for each country. The ēa for a coun-
try is determined taking the absolute value of the dierence between the mean value of a forecasted variable
and the mean of the actual data for the variable in the ISSP and HDR.
JASSS, 21(1) 4, 2018 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/21/1/4.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3596
Model Type Parameters
LRRP Prediction 0.053 + (0.90 ×RPcurrent)
LR SB Prediction 0.01 + (0.89 × SBcurrent)
LRBIG Prediction −0.01 + (0.91 ×BIGcurrent)
LRES Prediction 0.07 + (0.99 × EScurrent)
ABM Predictions EH = 0.40; β = 9.4 × 10−4
RP = Mean Religious Practice, ES = Existential Se-
curity, SB = Mean Supernatural Beliefs, BIG =
Mean Belief In God, EH = Education Homophily
Table 3: Parameterizations of models from competing approaches
5.7 For the LR models this entails identifying the regression coeicients for each variable used as input. For our
agent-based model this entails identifying values for the parameters: (1) Education Homophily (EH) and (2)
Douglas-Cobb Function β. Since the ABM is stochastic, 100 replications of each trial are performed and the
mean of the 100 outputs is used.
5.8 To avoid overfitting the LR models, we only include LR models with statistically significant variables. Further-
more, since the ISSP does not collect longitudinal data, each LRmodel is only trained on country-level data (i.e.
mean RP, mean SB, mean BIG) as opposed to individual-level data. These two factors (statistical significance
andonly country-level data) result in LRmodelswhich includeonlyonevariable, the current country-level value
of the variable being predicted.
5.9 Recall, our data set only has two dierent time periods (ISSP: 1991 - 1998 / HDR: 1990 - 2000 and ISSP: 1998 -
2008 /HDR: 2000 - 2010). As a result, we fit the parameters of the regressionmodels and the agent-basedmodel
using data from the first time period. Then we evaluate the accuracy of eachmodel’s forecasts using data from
the second time period. Since one time step in our agent-basedmodel corresponds to oneweek, we simulation
520 time steps (10 years) in training and evaluation. The models and their parameters are shown in Table 3.
5.10 Next, we use the identified parameters to forecast the ISSP and HDR values for the upcoming time period. Ac-
curacy of a forecast is measured by the RMSE of the ēa for each variable for each country from the actual data (
ISSP: 1998 - 2008 / HDR: 2000 - 2010). In addition, we evaluate the RMSE of the absolute error of the standard
deviation of the forecast (σea) for each country for the variables religious practice, supernatural beliefs, and
belief in God from the actual data. We cannot evaluate the RMSE of σea for the existential security variable be-
cause the HDR data is recorded on a per country level, not a per person level. This limitation means that the
existential security data for each country is a single number and does not have a distribution or variance. The
overall accuracy of eachmodel is reported in Table 4. The results for each individual country for all approaches
are reported in Appendix C and the results for our ABM are shown in Figure 6.
RMSE Religious Practice Supernatural Beliefs Belief In God Existential Security
Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM
RMSE
ēa 0.052 0.059 0.039 0.058 0.070 0.058 0.057 0.037 0.028 0.039 0.024 0.008
σea 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.018 NA
ēa = absolute error of the mean forecast; σea = absolute error of the standard deviation of the forecast.
Table 4: Evaluation of the accuracy of predictions from competing approaches for countries on which models
were trained
5.11 Table 4 shows that our parameterizedABMoutperforms thebaseline andLRapproaches. Recall, each approach
forecasts changes in the four variables for agivencountryover agiven timeperiod. For eachof the four variables
that eachmodel predicts, the ABM has the lowest RMSE for the: (1) ēa - absolute error of themean forecast and
(2) σea - absolute error of the standard deviation of the forecast. This means that the forecasts for each of the
four variables from the ABM better match the central tendency and variation of changes observed in the ISSP
and HDR than the competing alternatives. Based on the factor and the evaluation measure, the ABM ranges
from as accurate (RPσea ) to 3×more accurate (ESēa ) than the next best alternative.
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5.12 Next, we evaluate how eectively each of the trained models forecast changes in the four factors for a set of
countries they have not been trained on. In this evaluation we use the 11 countries for which we have ISSP and
HDR data from themost recent time period (ISSP 1998 - 2008 / HDR 2000 - 2010), but do not have data from the
training time period (ISSP: 1991 - 1998 / HDR: 1990 - 2000). These countries are: Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
France, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and Japan.
5.13 This evaluation gives us insight into the robustness of the parameterizations identified in training. We use the
term robust to reflect forecast accuracy for previously unseen countries and time periods. Again, we evaluate
the RMSE of ēa andσea of each of the threemodeling approaches for the 11 new countries. The overall accuracy
of each model is reported in Table 5. The results for each individual country for all approaches are reported in
Appendix D and the results for our ABM are shown in Figure 6.
RMSE Religious Practice Supernatural Beliefs Belief In God Existential Security
Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM
RMSE
ēa 0.032 0.041 0.032 0.065 0.105 0.065 0.039 0.037 0.033 0.41 0.024 0.011
σea 0.024 0.029 0.019 0.023 0.035 0.017 0.029 0.028 0.012 NA
ēa = absolute error of the mean forecast; σea = absolute error of the standard deviation of the forecast.
Table 5: Evaluation of the accuracy of predictions from competing approaches for countries on which models
were not trained
5.14 The evaluation shows that the ABMcontinues to performaswell as the best approach evenwhen it is applied to
forecast countries where training data did not exist. Furthermore, for several evaluationmeasures it continues
to be multiple times more accurate than the best alternative. These results provide some evidence that our
model can be used to forecast current changes in the religiosity and existential security for other countries not
included in the evaluation. However, it should be noted the performance of our model in Table 5 (no training
data) relative to the alternative approaches is not as strong as in Table 4 (training data).
5.15 This could be a result of incorrectly fitting our model. Recall, the use of our model in the evaluation follows a
logic: first parameters within our model are fit using a data set and then the accuracy of a forecast is evaluated
using a dierent data set from the same data source. However, an ABM fit in this manner, like any other model,
may oer predictions at a certain level of accuracy despite using inaccurate parameter values (Chattoe-Brown
2014; Gore et al. 2017). This can happen because relevant variables that should be included in the model (i.e.
gender and ethnicity) are not included.
5.16 Weare aware of this limitation of ourmodel and itmay bemanifested in the results of our evaluation. However,
we are not aware of any other data sets, besides the ones we are currently employing, that could be used to
evaluate our model and the two alternative models. Furthermore, our statistical analysis of the data sets has
yet to reveal relevant significant dierences across other possibly relevant variables (i.e. gender and ethnicity)
with respect to the religiosity factors identified in Figure 1. Next, we explore the features of the model that
distinguish it from alternative approaches included in the evaluation. Then, we discuss this issue further along
with other limitations of our model.
Model Exploration
6.1 Three features distinguish our model from the alternative approaches included in the evaluation. These fea-
tures are: (1) the existence of social networks with educational homophily, (2) the ability of agents to influence
the religious practice and existential insecurity variables of one another via social networks, and (3) the ability
of agents to influence the existential security level of the environment. To highlight how these features create
conditions that enable accurate forecasts we explore the dynamics of our ABM predictions.
6.2 First, we consider how the existence of social networkswith educational homophily aect change in the agent’s
religious practice variable throughout the simulation. Existing research has shown that the level of education
one has is inversely correlated with the extent of one’s religious practice (Albrecht & Heaton 1984; Larson &
Witham 1998; Glaeser & Sacerdote 2008; McCauley 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais 2013). This relationship also
exists within the ISSP dataset where the two variables have a -0.14 correlation with a p-value less than 0.01.
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6.3 Our ABM implements this correlation through the educational homophily (EH) parameter. Recall, the EH pa-
rameter controls the degree of educational uniformity within one’s social network. This feature is important
because it provides a means for the sustained existence of groups of individuals with high religious practices,
belief in God, and supernatural beliefs in countries where themajority of the population has low religious prac-
tices, belief in God, and supernatural beliefs. In other words, this feature ensures that every agent in the popu-
lation does not take on all the preferences of the majority.
Figure 5: Change in the religious practices, belief in God, and supernatural beliefs of agents from all countries
for agents with similar initial respective variable values, broken down by education level.
6.4 Figure 5 elucidates this feature in our ABM. It shows the amount of change for agents in the ABM with similar
initial values for their religious practices, belief in God, and supernatural beliefs broken down by education
level. For each variable (religious practice, belief in God, and supernatural beliefs) the population is formed by
running the ABM for all 22 countries and then matching each agent attached to a network where the majority
of the members completed higher secondary education with a similar agent attached to a network where the
majority of the members did not complete higher secondary education. Agents are considered similar if the
initial values of the variable for the two agents diers by less than 0.01.
6.5 Figure 5 shows that within our ABM, in social networks where the majority of agents have completed post sec-
ondary education, agents have on average a steeper decline in their religious practices and belief in God than
agents connected to social networks where the majority of agents have not completed post secondary educa-
tion. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that agents connected to social networks where themajority of agents have
completedpost secondary education, onaverage, donot increase their supernatural beliefs, while those agents
connected to social networks where the majority of agents have not completed post secondary education, do
increase their supernatural beliefs.
6.6 These dynamics can grow a society where two individuals with the same initial religious practices (or belief In
God, or supernatural beliefs) evolve dierently based on the educational backgrounds of the individuals with
which they surround themselves.
6.7 Next, we explore: (1) how the social networks in our ABM create changes in existential security for each of the
countries and (2) how those changes in the existential security level of the ABM environment correlate with
changes in religious practice, supernatural beliefs and, belief In God. For each of the 22 countries presented
in our evaluation, the ABM predicts that the existential security of the environment will increase over time.
The extent of that increase, how accurate the prediction is, and how the predictions correlates with predicted
changes in the religiosity variables are shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Predicted change from our ABM for the existential security, mean religious practices, mean belief in
God, andmean supernatural beliefs of agents for each country from 2000 - 2010.
6.8 Figure 6 shows that when the existential security level of the environment in our ABM is high (>0.80) almost
all agents feel existentially secure and the existential security level of the environment immediately increases.
These types of predictions for our ABM are seen for countries including: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
6.9 However, if the initial existential security level of the environment is less than 0.80, there is not any growth in
the existential security of the environment during the first three years. Eventually, the social network interac-
tions of the agents within the ABM result in fewer agents with extreme existential insecurity values, creating
fewer agents that feel existentially insecure and ultimately creating an increase in the existential security of the
environment starting aer year three. This increase continues through year ten. These types of predictions for
ourmodel are seen for countries including: Chile, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
6.10 This pattern of predicting staggered existential security growth is even more pronounced for countries where
the initial existential security value is less than 0.65. This is the case with our ABM’s prediction for the Philip-
pines. Here there is no growth in the existential security of the environment for the first seven years of the
prediction until finally there are enough social network interactions of the agents within the ABM to create a
suicient number of agents that feel existentially secure resulting in an increase in the existential security of
the environment from years seven to ten.
6.11 It is important to note that ourmodel does not predict existential security growth for countrieswhere the initial
existential security value of the environment is below 0.50. Under these conditions the existential security of
the environment decreases over time. Recall, the existential insecurity level of agents is uniformly distributed
from [0,1]. As the agents interact, the existential insecurity level of each agent becomes less extreme, but since
the existential security of the environment is below 0.50 most agents in the population still feel existentially
insecure despite less extreme existential insecurity values.
6.12 The behavior of our model under these conditions needs to be explored further and refined. The HDR data
shows that the existential security value of the environment increases for many countries with an initial value
less than 0.50. As currently constructed ourmodel cannot replicate this behavior. However, it is also important
to note that all the countries in the HDR that show a decrease over time in the existential security value of the
environment are countrieswhere the initial value is less than0.50. In futureworkwewill look toproduceamore
refined algorithm that takes into account each of these possible trajectories for countries with low existential
security.
6.13 Figure 6 also shows that each increase in existential security predicted by our ABM is coupled with predictions
for a decrease in belief in God. Furthermore, the magnitude of the predicted increase in existential security is
almost exactly the same as themagnitude of the predicted decrease in belief in God. It is important to note that
this relationship between existential security and belief in God is not encoded in any of the rules or interactions
within our model. It emerges from the model interactions and the data that parameterizes the model for each
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of the countries. We will explore this result and gather more data as to why the same trend does not exist for
supernatural beliefs and religious practice in future work.
Model Validity and Limitations
7.1 Construct, internal, and external validity threats aect our model. In addition to these validity threats, our
model has a number of limitations. Here we review each of these areas and discuss how they relate to our
model.
Construct validity
7.2 Threats to construct validity concern the appropriateness of themeasures used to represent the entities in our
model. While the data processing we use to leverage existing data sets reflects a novel means to construct an
ABM, it limits the construct validity of our model in four ways.
7.3 First, recall that we employ factors scores to aggregate and convert the Likert scores in the ISSP survey into
continuous variables in the construction of the religious architecture for our agents (Figure 3). Constructing
agents that reasonwith a continuous representation of discretized data (i.e. Likert scores) can bias themanner
in which the survey data informs themodel in some cases (Flache &Macy 2006). It is important to note though,
that oen fundamental results for models that use a continuous representation of discrete data generalize to
other models that with a similar formalization of social influence (Flache et al. 2017).
7.4 Second, constructing a SEM that is based on aggregate data may reduce the means in which agents can store
and change their individual opinions in the model (Epstein 1999; Chattoe-Brown 2014). However, the previ-
ous section shows that ourmodel is capable of producing societies where two individuals with the same initial
religious practices (or belief In God, or supernatural beliefs) evolve dierently based on the educational back-
grounds of the individuals with which they surround themselves.
7.5 Third, the social networks employed inourmodel are static. While thenetworks enable the variables associated
with each agent to change over time, the structure of the network and the weight of each link does not change.
As a result, our networks do not reflect exogenous events (e.g., work change, death of a node, marriages, etc.).
In futureworkwewill explore the interplay of individual behavior andnetworkdynamicsby taking advantageof
existing research in computational sociology. Specifically we will explore work on the co-evolution of behavior
and social network structure (Fehl et al. 2011) as well as approaches to study the coevolution of networks in
social dilemmas (Corten2014; Bravoet al. 2012). Weexpect thatwork in this directionmayenableus tohighlight
the self organizationof religiousgroups related toeducationandexistential security as shown in (Abrica-Jacinto
et al. 2017).
7.6 Finally, the largest concern related to construct validity involves equifinality. The construction of our model
required us to make a series of reasonable assumptions to fill unanticipated specificity gaps. While we did our
best to address each gap with the most reasonable assumption, many other reasonable assumptions could
also have beenmade, and it is likely that some of themodels resulting from those assumptions would produce
models with similar, possibly even superior, levels of forecast accuracy (Poile & Safayeni 2016). The choices
in our model serve as recommendations for other researchers tasked within similar problems but we are also
open to a dialog on alternative selections within our model construction.
Internal and external validity
7.7 Internal validity threats arisewhen factors aect thedependent variableswithout themodelers knowledge. It is
possible that some implementation flaws could have aected the evaluation results. However, the algorithms
we used towithin ourmodel passed several internal code reviews and the RMSE of the ēa and σea of themodel
for each of the countries reflect the mean value taken over 100 replications.
7.8 Threats to external validity occurwhen the results of themodel cannot be generalized. Although the evaluation
was performed for using ∼ 20 years of data from two well known sources the results of our model cannot be
generalized to: (1) other countries, (2) during dierent years or (3) dierent data sets.
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Limitations
7.9 It is important tonote thatourmodeldoesnotoer amoreaccurateprediction for religiouspractice, supernatu-
ral beliefs, belief In God and existential security than the two alternativemodels for every country. However, for
the countries on which themodels were trained our model oers more accurate predictions for: 8/11 countries
for Religious Practice, 7/11 countries for Supernatural Beliefs, 6/11 for Belief In God, 11/11 for Existential Security.
This reflects a statistically significant superior level of accuracy for our model compared to the best of the two
alternatives for each country with p< 0.05 (p = 0.012). This is evidence that the superior level of accuracy for
our model on countries for which it was trained is more than just random noise in the output of the models.
7.10 For the countries on which the models were not trained our model oers more accurate predictions for: 4/11
countries for Religious Practice, 6/11 countries for Supernatural Beliefs, 2/11 for Belief In God, 9/11 for Existential
Security. This does not reflect a statistically significant superior level of accuracy for ourmodel compared to the
best of the two alternatives for each country. As discussed in the Evaluation, this may be a result of over fitting
the model for countries on which it was trained or under fitting the model by not including enough relevant
variables. Additionally, the lack of a statistically significant superior level of accuracy may indicate that our
assumption that religiouspractice, supernatural beliefs, belief InGodandexistential security are all times series
that are instances of the underlying data generation process is incorrect. Each of these possible explanations
will be explored in future work.
7.11 Finally, we emphasize that we have only evaluated our ABM against two alternative approaches, neither of
which is an ABM. While, the Baseline and LR models reflect accessible alternate strategies to forecasting reli-
gious practice, supernatural beliefs, belief In God and existential security, they are simple models. However,
our evaluation serves as a platform for other researchers to try and construct alternative ABMs with superior
accuracy in the same manner. Providing such a platform is a necessary step to creating models of complex
systems that can inform policy decisions (Ahrweiler et al. 2015).
Conclusion
8.1 Our work employs existing data sets and agent-based modeling to forecast changes in the religiosity and ex-
istential security among a collective of individuals over time. Our model includes agents in social networks
interacting with one another based on the education level of the agents, the religious practices of the agents,
and each agent’s existential security within their natural and social environments. The data used to inform
the values and relationships among these variables is based on rigorous statistical analysis of the International
Social Survey Programme Religion Module (ISSP) and the Human Development Report (HDR).
8.2 Our results show that for a given country and a given time period, ourmodel provides amore accurate forecast
of changes in the existential security and the religiosity than two alternative approaches for a specific time
period for specific countries. While the context in which of our model is valid is constrained and the model has
a number of limitations it reflects an eort to link empiricism and theory within an ABM. In future work, we will
explore additionalmechanisms thatmay help to further clarify the changes in religiosity observed in ourmodel
and the possible adaptive role of secularization.
Appendix A: Model parameters and references
Variable Description Value Source
DOUGLAS_COBB_BETA Value of β in Douglas-Cobb
Function
9.4 × 10−4 Trained w/ ISSP and HDR
Country Country to forecast Identified in Table 7 ISSP and HDR
startYear Initial year to forecast 1998 ISSP
endYear Final year to forecast 2008 ISSP
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Continued
Variable Description Value Source
numberOfAgents Number of agents to simu-
late
5,000 Sensitivity analysis shows
this value
yields stable results be-
tween runs
COUNTRY_ES Existential security level of
country
HDI value for Country HDR (Anand 1994)
Agent Parameters
supernaturalBeliefs supernatural beliefs of
agent
[0,1] randomly sampled ISSP re-
spondent
normalized factor score*
religiousFormation religious formationof agent [0,1] randomly sampled ISSP re-
spondent
normalized factor score*
beliefInGod belief in God of agent [0,1] randomly sampled ISSP re-
spondent
normalized factor score*
religiousPractice religious practice of agent [0,1] randomly sampled ISSP re-
spondent
normalized factor score*
educationLevel education level of agent response on 6-point
scale
randomly sampled ISSP re-
spondent*
(1) no formal educa-
tion to
(6) university level w/
degree
securityLevel existential security level of
agent
U [0,1] Compared against
COUNTRY_ES




initialize all parameters for
an agent
Network Parameters
EDUCATION_HOMOPHILY Educational similarity be-
tween agents in the net-
work
0.40 Trained w/ ISSP and HDR
timeStepLength Length in weeks to interact
w/all agents in network
1 specified in (Conti et al.
2011)
W_MEAN µ of normal distribution for
support group size
0.3217 fw in(Conti et al. 2011)
W_STD σ of normal distribution for
ratio determining support
group size
0.1608 fw in (Conti et al. 2011)
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Continued
Variable Description Value Source
S_ALPHA α of gamma distribution of
sympathy group size
4.1 fs in (Conti et al. 2011)
S_BETA β of gamma distribution of
sympathy group size
3.49 fs in (Conti et al. 2011)
B_ALPHA α of gamma distribution of
network construction time
budget
205.48 fb in (Conti et al. 2011)
B_BETA β of gamma distribution of
network construction time
budget
8.5264 fb in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_K_ALPHA α of gamma distribution of
weight of kin relationships
in the network
1.85 fe,k in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_K_BETA β of gamma distribution of
weight of kin relationships
in the network
2.296 fe,k in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_NK_MEAN µ of gamma distribution of
weight of non-kin relation-
ships in the network
0.485 fe,nk in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_NK_STD σ of gamma distribution of
weight of non-kin relation-
ships in the network
0.17 fe,nk in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_K_SUP_LOWER_LIMIT lower limit on weight of
kin relationship in support
group
0.8582 lowk,sup in(Conti et al. 2011)
E_K_SYM_LOWER_LIMIT lower limit on weight of
kin relationship in sympa-
thy group
0.7247 lowk,sym in(Conti et al.
2011)
E_NK_SUP_LOWER_LIMIT lower limit on weight of
non-kin relationship in sup-
port group
0.8185 lownk,sup in (Conti et al.
2011)
E_NK_SYM_LOWER_LIMIT lower limit on weight of
kin relationship in sympa-
thy group
0.6852 lownk,sym in (Conti et al.
2011)
E_MAX maximum weight of a rela-
tionship in network
1.0 emax in (Conti et al. 2011)
E_MIN minimum weight of a rela-
tionship in network
0.0 emin in (Conti et al. 2011)
Table 6
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Appendix B: Country data availability
Data Availability Data Availability Data Availability
Country ISSP 1991 / HDR 1990 ISSP 1998 / HDR 2000 ISSP 2008 / HDR 2010
Austria NO / YES YES / YES NO / YES
Chile NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Cyprus NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Czech Republic NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
France NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Germany YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Hungary YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Israel NO / YES NO / YES YES / YES
Latvia NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Netherlands YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Poland YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Portugal NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Slovenia NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Spain NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
United Kingdom YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
United States YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
New Zealand YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Sweden NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Switzerland NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Ireland YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Denmark NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Japan NO / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Australia YES / YES NO / YES YES / YES
Italy YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Norway YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Philippines YES / YES YES / YES YES / YES
Table 7: Data Availability By Country, Year, and Source
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Appendix C: Results for countries models were trained on
Country Religious Practice Supernatural Beliefs Belief In God Existential Security
Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM
Germany
ēa 0.088 0.102 0.067 0.119 0.175 0.124 0.085 0.056 0.046 0.051 0.009 0.009
σea 0.006 0.029 0.005 0.003 0.035 0.009 0.004 0.026 0.021 NA
Hungary
ēa 0.048 0.068 0.022 0.020 0.051 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.023 0.051 0.009 0.006
σea 0.01 0.014 0.004 0.001 0.034 0.018 0.010 0.032 0.028 NA
Ireland
ēa 0.067 0.059 0.059 0.023 0.127 0.039 0.006 0.022 0.005 0.047 0.013 0.006
σea 0.048 0.064 0.013 0.013 0.039 0.005 0.014 0.008 0.019 NA
Italy
ēa 0.019 0.022 0.011 0.022 0.065 0.037 0.004 0.021 0.014 0.040 0.020 0.007
σea 0.01 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.021 0.012 0.044 0.021 0.032 NA
Netherlands
ēa 0.002 0.021 0.036 0.039 0.101 0.038 0.072 0.042 0.011 0.032 0.028 0.006
σea 0.023 0.005 0.001 0.091 0.055 0.084 0.032 0.007 0.002 NA
New Zealand
ēa 0.011 0.025 0.006 0.035 0.086 0.034 0.091 0.052 0.008 0.031 0.029 0.007
σea 0.009 0.038 0.006 0.006 0.044 0.003 0.015 0.013 0.017 NA
Norway
ēa 0.081 0.106 0.052 0.106 0.172 0.096 0.051 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.037 0.005
σea 0.081 0.055 0.025 0.049 0.012 0.044 0.015 0.010 0.017 NA
Philippines
ēa 0.023 0.038 0.031 0.027 0.044 0.010 0.007 0.041 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.013
σea 0.020 0.003 0.090 0.020 0.037 0.021 0.012 0.037 0.008 NA
Poland
ēa 0.039 0.035 0.046 0.043 0.078 0.071 0.053 0.029 0.049 0.043 0.018 0.007
σea 0.023 0.041 0.032 0.014 0.043 0.001 0.015 0.007 0.021 NA
United Kingdom
ēa 0.057 0.06 0.028 0.054 0.096 0.053 0.022 0.011 0.029 0.041 0.019 0.002
σea 0.007 0.033 0.009 0.007 0.052 0.010 0.005 0.019 0.002 NA
United States
ēa 0.049 0.045 0.028 0.045 0.068 0.006 0.097 0.058 0.035 0.026 0.034 0.010
σea 0.003 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.054 0.006 0.015 0.010 0.016 NA
RMSE
ēa 0.052 0.059 0.039 0.058 0.070 0.058 0.057 0.037 0.028 0.039 0.024 0.008
σea 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.018 NA
Table 8: Accuracy of predictions from competing approaches
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Appendix D: Results for countries models were not trained on
Country Religious Practice Supernatural Beliefs Belief In God Existential Security
Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM Base LR ABM
Chile
ēa 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.015 0.046 0.004 0.033 0.001 0.012 0.062 0.001 0.014
σea 0.003 0.021 0.023 0.002 0.026 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.023 NA
Cyprus
ēa 0.018 0.012 0.026 0.024 0.059 0.001 0.040 0.062 0.040 0.048 0.012 0.004
σea 0.054 0.067 0.004 0.049 0.074 0.030 0.044 0.062 0.005 NA
Czech Republic
ēa 0.067 0.091 0.035 0.096 0.166 0.080 0.024 0.006 0.039 0.042 0.018 0.006
σea 0.010 0.016 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.012 0.036 0.008 NA
France
ēa 0.012 0.039 0.020 0.032 0.105 0.019 0.037 0.014 0.007 0.033 0.027 0.010
σea 0.014 0.011 0.037 0.009 0.027 0.001 0.038 0.013 0.009 NA
Portugal
ēa 0.042 0.046 0.026 0.170 0.208 0.166 0.066 0.088 0.081 0.037 0.024 0.012
σea 0.030 0.051 0.002 0.035 0.065 0.028 0.030 0.005 0.011 NA
Slovenia
ēa 0.031 0.010 0.061 0.029 0.040 0.003 0.033 0.008 0.008 0.052 0.008 0.006
σea 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.024 0.012 0.016 0.044 0.019 0.005 NA
Spain
ēa 0.023 0.034 0.009 0.014 0.068 0.055 0.002 0.022 0.017 0.040 0.020 0.006
σea 0.004 0.026 0.010 0.010 0.023 0.009 0.010 0.032 0.006 NA
Sweden
ēa 0.047 0.071 0.020 0.031 0.104 0.036 0.053 0.02 0.028 0.004 0.050 0.029
σea 0.032 0.009 0.005 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.024 0.027 NA
Switzerland
ēa 0.019 0.007 0.040 0.003 0.056 0.004 0.042 0.012 0.006 0.036 0.020 0.001
σea 0.026 0.002 0.027 0.032 0.001 0.029 0.045 0.021 0.002 NA
Denmark
ēa 0.004 0.023 0.024 0.047 0.121 0.061 0.04 0.018 0.006 0.046 0.010 0.002
σea 0.004 0.015 0.020 0.003 0.034 0.006 0.022 0.003 0.005 NA
Japan
ēa 0.024 0.002 0.041 0.049 0.019 0.065 0.029 0.044 0.031 0.027 0.033 0.005
σea 0.014 0.004 0.027 0.005 0.023 0.001 0.009 0.029 0.012 NA
RMSE
ēa 0.032 0.041 0.032 0.065 0.105 0.065 0.039 0.037 0.033 0.41 0.024 0.011
σea 0.024 0.029 0.019 0.023 0.035 0.017 0.029 0.028 0.012 NA
Table 9: Accuracy of predictions from competing approaches
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